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With the case study of Sweden as 2 basis,some extended aPproach has been
suggested to the inclusion of dynamic Performances into the process of cost
alocation in water resources development. A multi―object?e programming
model has been'developed based on the notion of ttcore" in terms of cooper―
ative games,  Some demonstration has been made to suggest the applicability
of the model and needed further attempts in line of this paper have been
suggested.
1. IntrOductiOn
ln the field of、vater resources management,there have been mounting concerns
about hO、v to reconcile conflicting interests among the different parties involved.
Among a variety of conflict problems is the 、vell‐knowa problern i how to split he
total costs of a joint pЮject among different useぉ。 This pЮblem,which is genera■y
called ttcOst allocation", is the major concern of this paper.
The water resources field has extensive literature on this thexne. A/1any approaches
have been proposed,tested,and modified therein, and some of them appear to have
gained extensive publicity and application in this field.
In the fo110、ving section、ve shall start 、vi h he taxonomy of cost allocation, there―
by referring to the available lnethods, conventional and ne、71y developed olles,
、vhich fall into the different categories of the taxonomy, The discussion wi11 lead
to the recent work by Young, Okada and Hashil■otoつ; its exte sion being suggested
to the dyna■lic process of allocating costs. Section 3 will discuss a pilot approaCh to
the proposed extension of cost allocation as an inter‐active man―In chine dialogu
system. Vヽith the southern part of S、veden called Skane as the study area and based
on the above‐cited work,a multi‐object?e pЮgramming model will be developed;
followed by the analysis of the computation results derived fro■l the model. In the
conclusion assessment will be made of the applicability of the model presented herein
and suggestion made on the needed further effort to introduce the suggested approach
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into the field of cost allocation.
2. Taxo40my Of Cost A1location
There seerns to be a myth in the cost allocation that cost allocation is no more than
a financial analysis, For example, James and Lee state2)that “since co t allocation
deter■lines how much each party should pay, it is part of financial analysis. It is
llever part of econonlic analysis. Fixed costs which cannot be directly attributed to
any proiect purpose are not lnarginal and thus have no influence on optiinum design
(they may affect econo■li  iuStification)but Since they must be paid, financial ana―
lysis is required to assign the■l to omeolle", This kind of limited definition of cost
allocation has prevailed in the field of cost allocation and seems to be accepted as
an established aズom.   Table l lists a set of available cost allocation methods, The
most conspicuous and widely used among them is the Separable Cost Remaining
Benefit(SCRB)?【ethOd,2)3)4)This method whse origin dates back to the 1950'S when
it was apphed to the T.V.A. proieCtS in the Uo S,A., has been further develoed
Table I Cost al10catiom methods
Arnount to Be Allocated
Vehicle
Total
COSt
う            ο
Direct     Separable
cOst       cOst
excluded  excluded
4 Equal
B Unit of use
C Priority of use
D Net beneFit
β Alternative cost
F Smaller of benefit or alternative cost
?
?
?
?
?
?
4う      4σ
βう      βι
Cう        Cじ
Dう      つθ
どう      どθ
Fう     」♂
in other countries including Japan tO COnstitute the legal basis of the present cost
allocation procedures. Okada5, haS Criticized that the SCRB, which represents the
conventional cost allocation methods is based also on the liH?ted definition that cost
allocation is no more than a financial analysis.
To understand how li=nited the definition is, let us raize the question i Why、vould
the participants agree to stay with the project before they knew their share of costs?
This is precisely the question of tte participants' incentives.  By 〔くincen ves" 、ve
mean the inducements for prospective uses to take part in a iOint project. In light
of this consideration Young, Okada and Hashimoto have claiined that a potent way
to formulate the incentives of participants is to look at their bargaining stricture.
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They have identified a set of basic principles that ought to be embodied in cost
allocation,have then proceeded to a systematic check of both conventional and game
theoretic methods against the basic principles. They proposed that the notion of
くecore'' in terms of cooperative games constitutes the basis of cost allocation ancl satis―
fies the principle of 〔tindividual'' and ttgroup rationality" and はmarginality princi―
ple".  They concluded that the computational methods including the SCR13 and
some game theoretic methods do not satisfy the core, nor the other principle called
ttlnonotonicity principle".  They sho、ved that only a couple of lesser kno、vn method
from game theory, it et, the Weak Nucleolus (WN) and the Proportional Nucleolus
(PN)MethOd proved to be rnore appropriate.
The extent to 、vhich cost allocation has implications for iIIlcentive analysis may
depend largely on the level or stage of planning in which cost allocation is discussed.
We may roughly classify the process of planning a water development project into
several stages, 1. e., motivation, project design and appraisal,proieCt implementation,
and operation and maintenance.  Table II lists the type of analysis required at each
stage of planning. This sho、vs that the carlier the stage of planning is, the more
important becolnes the incentive analysis.
Table II Pian4量ng stage v, s, type of analysis needed
Stage of PIanning Type of Analysis required
earlier motivation
investigation
Project design and appraisal
prOieCt implementation
operation and maintenance
incentive analysis, monitoring
鋒急淑群:X∫nd hCendve analyslL
寵辮 :監a駕テ監津脇ξttJySiSB
殻熱き監I阜翌に,と照対温♂Л戸勇management
眠縄 靴1絆1許上臀液1哲
Behind this discussion is aloso the question of whether cost allocation demands
a normative approach or an elnpirical approach, One may argue that cost allocation
should be no more than a normative approach. Notably、7hen COst all cation is clas―
sified into a financial analysis, it ilnplies that cost allocation is a kind of normative
analysis. This type of argument is co■11■Only based on the claiin that from the
point of view of social fairness and iustiCe and from a managerial standpoint, a
procedure must be established、vhi(れapplie  to hundreds of silnilar cost allocation
problems.
There is,however, a natural situation in、vhich e14pirical analysis lleeds to be done
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in cost allocationo Suppose there has not yet been any cost allocation procedure
established and one desires to pick up those rules or norms which patternize 、vhat
may turn out to be a normative procedure in the future, Another case may be that
although set of norms or principles have been proposed by the project organizer or
some of the participants,the participants desire to obtain a deeper understanding of
what is implied by the application of those norms to cost allocation. Both situations
are Si141lar in that the process of allocating costs is regarded as a kind of learning
process by、vhich the participants can corne to identify a co■1lnon set of principles or
by、vhich the participants can become more fa■11liar with the preselected principles.
To suHllnarize the above discussion we may state that the conventional methods
represented by the SCRB fail to incorporate the function of incentive analysis and
empirical analysiso  We will develop this discussion more concretely by placing
the scope of analysis on the context of the Swedish Case Study as carried out by
Young Okada,and Hashimoto,
3。  Swedish Case Studyl)
The study area consists of eighteen municipalties in the Skane region of southern
Sweden. At present most of the municipal water supply is drawn froni three sources
: local ground water,and two separate pipenne systems、vhich distribut 、vater from
two lakes Vombsion and Ringsjon.As early as the 1940's,some municipalities in the
area realized the possibility of shortages in local water sources and turned their
attention to off‐site sources,  An association called the Sydvatten Company 、v s
formed by several of theni to plan for 10ng‐term water supply and management of
the region.  In the late 1960's, this group (cOnsisting presently of 12 of the munici―
palities)began to design a maior prOject to obtain water from a lake outside the
region (Lake Bolinen)via an 80 km. tunnel.
The viabintv Of the proiect depends on ho、v many mu icipanties 、v ll participate
in the proieCt, and this in turn is dependent on ho、v much th y Ⅵ「in be obliged to
pay by participating in such a developlnent vis‐a―vis th  avai ability and costs of
developing their own on―site sourceso When they started the discussion of cost allo―
cation,they learned that there had not been no established method available for this
type of cost allocation, As a colnpro■lise they ame to agree that the total joint
costs be allocated in proportion to population. Recently this project has been under―
going a period of recollsideration as the actual increase in population and water
demand over the past decade has turned out to be short of the original forecasts.
Since their cost allocation is based on population, this has prompted disputes over
the validity of the employed method.
This problem is presicely what Young, Okada and Hashilnoto dealt 、vith.  For
details of the discussion and
reference。)As a basis for
this study we sunllnarize
their work as follows.
1)There are six independ‐
ent  (group of)muniCi‐
palities,A,H,K, L,M
and T as Shown in Fig。
1.
2)For each municipality
there are basically three
alternatives ;(1) going
alone by developing its
、vater source on its o、vn ;
(li)Staying with the joint
enterprise ; and (iii) de―
veloping a smaller ,oint
venture by fornling a co―
alition、vith the other pro―
spective municipalities.
3)Table III lists a set of
possible alternatives(in―
dividual and joint enter―
prises)against the calcu―
lated ■linimuni cost of
its implementation.  Let
this cost, C(S)be Caned
(iOint)COSt Characteristic
function defined for coa―
lition S(when the project
is undertaken by a single
municipanty,(s)=4, Ir,
X,と, ■√or T , which
means that the coalition
member is single or that
there is no coalition in
the narro、v sense)。
4)With thiS Setting in
■lind they have identified
血e methods developed
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Fig, 1. study area and grOuping Of 18 municipalities.
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Tabic III cOaltion,atterns and ioint COSt characteristic functions calculated for the
Swedish case study(Mittlions of Swedish crowns).
A
H
K
L
M
T
AH
A,K
A,L
A,M
A ,T
HK
HL
H,こヽ
とI,T
K,L
KM
K,T
LM
L,T
MT
21.95
17.08
10.91
15.88
20.81
21.98
34,69
32.86
37.83
42.76
43,93
22.96
25.00
37.89
39,06
26.79
31.45
32.89
31.10
37,86
39.41
AHK
AHL
AH,M
A■,T
A,K,L
A,KM
A,K,T
A,LM
A,L,T
A,MT
HKL
HKM
HK,T
HL,M
HL,T
H,MT
K,LM
K,L,T
K,MT
LMT
40,74
43.22
55.50
56.67
48,74
53.40
54.85
53.05
59.81
61,36
27.26
42.55
44.94
45,81
46.98
56.49
42,01
48,77
50.32
51.46
48,95
60,25
62.72
64.03
65.20
74.10
63.96
70.72
73.41
48.07
49.24
59,35
64.41
56.61
72.27
69,76
77.42
83.00
70,93
73,97
66.46
83.82
AHKL
AHKM
AHK,T
AHL,M
AHL,T
AH,MT
A,K,LM
A,K,L,T
A,LMT
HKL,M
HKL,T
HKMT
HLMT
KLMT
A,K,MT
AHKLM
AHKMT
AHLMT
AHKL,T
AKLMT
HKLMT
AHKLMT
a set of principles to base the method of cost allocation. They are :(1)indiVidual
and group rationality which refer to the qualification that no participant or group
of participants would be induced to stay with the joint enterprise if he or those who
could contemplate the formation of their own coalition,were asked to pay more than
the cost of his indivudual proiect or Of their ioint project,(1三)marginality principle
which lneans that every collection of users should be charged at least as much as
the additional cost of serving thern,(?l)the principle of monotonicity which says
that if costs turn out to be higher than expected then no participant's allocation
should go down, and vice versa. It has been sho、vn that the condition which satis―
fies both (i)and (11)iS What has been kno、7n aS the notion of くtcore".
5)In order to single out a solution among those which satisfy the core, the Weak
Nucleolus  (WN)and the Proportional Nucleolus(PN)have been developed. It has
been theoretically proved and illustrated by the case stwdv that these t、vo lnethods
are more reasonable than the conventional methods and some other game_theoretic
mothods.  For reference the coコaputation results are shown in Table IV for the select―
ed different rnethods,
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Table lv COmputttion resuits for the selected methods
Proportional to Popuユation
Proportional to Demand
SCRB
ShaPley Value
Nucleolus
PrOPOrtional NucleOlus
Weak Nucleolus
Based on the filldings of the study the prospective participants were asked to
assess its conclusion. In general the study interested them very much and provided
them with a bisis for the improvement of their method.  It has been suggested,
however, that they would like the poroposed game theoretic approach to incとude the
dynanlic aspect of cost a1location, because the actual process of cost a1location devel―
ops Over time on a trial…and―erro  basis、vhen there is no agreelnent on what partic―
ular method should be employed.
This suggestion has motivated the intiation of t、vo studies. One is the study by
Stahl and another is this paper.  Stahl propoSed a ga■ling simulation appro ch to
the above_cited cost allocation.  He invited the water managers frorn the respective
municipalities to an experiinent、vith a set of instructions prescribed for the cost
allocation game. Based on the experilnental result he suggested that the particpants'
behavioral pattern proved to be well explained by what is il■plied by th  Shapley
rヽalue which is anothertype of game theoretic approach that is not based on the
notion of t(core".6)
This paper presents multi‐obiectiVe pЮgrammimg approach based on the cost,We
shall discuss this approach in the next section.
4. A Corettbased Cost A■ocaticln Game‐一A multi‐obieCti▼e programming
approach
4.l AssumlDtiOn
(D The game is to be based on the notion of core as the fundamental set of cOn―
straints on cost allocation.
(2)It iS known that the core exists for a given cost allocation pЮbleln, Play rs
(partiCipants)are requested to reach a comprottlise solution 、vhich they can select
fro■l the set of alternatives satisfying the core.
(3)Each individual player bears his o、vn goal in江工nd and wishes that his goal will
be attained as highly as possible. Hc is asked to prescribe for his goal the satisfac―
Iヽethod A
10.13
13.33
19.54
20.01
20,35
19.81
20.03
H
21.00
16・32
13.28
10.71
12.06
12.57
12.52
K
3.19
7.43
5,62
6.61
5.00
4.35
3.94
L
8,22
7.00
10。90
10.37
8.61
9.25
9.07
M
34.22
29,04
16.66
16.94
18.32
18.34
18.54
T
7.07
10.69
17.82
19.18
19,49
19.47
19.71
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tory and the per■lissible level of attainment(aCCOrdingly an allowable band of goal
attainment).
(4)Each player's goal is defined as HliniEliZing the cost to be allocated to hixnself.
(5)The per■1lssible level for each player's goal is identified with the principle of
t〔individual rationality". Let三す represent the per■lissible level for the gpal of
playerゲ. Then gF iS defined as :
ど, = ο ((ゲ)) (ゲ = ヱ, ・¨ η;η = σ fOr the case study). ・・・・…・・…。(1.1
(6)There are several variants of formulation to be developed, depending on ho、v one
specifies the satisfactory level for his goal, Two of those candidates are sugges ted :
a. We take the marginal cost computed for each individual as the satisfactory level
for his goal.  That is, for playerケ :
島 =θ(N)―ε(Ⅳ― (ゲ}) (ゲ = y,…″),…・………・…・・…・………(1,2)
where Fメrepresents the satisfactorv level for the goal of player ゲ ; and ^r stands
for the grand coalition which is the largest ioint Venture, the cost aHocation of
which is of our concern.
b.Alternately we set as the satisfactory level the minimum of the marginal costs
computable for all subsets of feasible coalition patterns. That is, for playerゲ :
ど'=望作(C(S+fゲ))一C(S))…… ……………………………
。(1,3)
(7)Since their goals、vould conflict if all the goals were attained to maximunl, the
game is formulated as a multi‐ObieciVe pЮgramm ng pЮblem.
(8)lrhere are a number of approaches available for both formulating and solving
this type of problem. As one pЮ■ ising approach let us take a goal progra■1lning
approach with the L‐ype utility function.7)S) we also assume that all the players
have agreed that the goals should be
well balanced in attainment. By ばwell‐
balanced" 、ve mean that the extent to
which the achievement of one's objectiVe
is remote from his satisfactory level needs
to be as close as possible to the extent
to which the achievement of the other's
ObieCtiVe is remote from his(the Other's)
satisfactory level.
4.2 Model fOrmulation
Based on ithe above assumptions let us
formulate the pЮblem by applying the
goal progra■lining based on the L―type
?
?〓
、??〓
??
?
??
utility ieve, va
utillly level ub
utility level uc
uctubくua
lve l
Fi9 2
Fig.2.Go雀】篭設 、ing WtthL■ype
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utinty function between goals(see Fig.2)
a,Objective fumctio■
財 %ε,0  (ゲO being arbitraryガ ; ゲ = ヱ, ・中,2)……………・……………・・…・(1,4)
b.Basic constraints
group rationality:遷s,≦θ(S)(S<N,S=0},ゲ=′,“ちη)……(1・5)
total allocation:,ぁ持=θ(N)(ゲ=ヱ,いち%)…………………。(1・6)
c. Goal Constraints
By taking the illdividual rationality as the perHlissible leveとwe get i
"′
≦ θ({ケ})=ど,(ゲ=′,・・,η)…… … … … … … … … … … …・(1,7)
Let us take(1. 2)as the Satisfactory levelo Then we get :
為 ― GJ+,す=ど,(ゲ=1,…,ら・・…・・・・・・・・・・―・・・・・…・・・…・。(1・8)
where ε, and ηゲ are deviational variables as illustated in Fig。2(εF' ηす ≧ °) n
the foll、vowing relation holds between deviational variables :
ε1/凡1= εす/λ,
凡す=lgデー三,
(ゲ =2,・・… ,夕)・ … … … … … … … …・・(1・9)
(ゲ =ヱ,・… ,2)・・… … … … … … … …・。(1・10)
4.3 0peration Strategy
The model Should be operated intuitively so that continued interactive dialogues
with the participants can be maintained and the computation results frOm One itera―
tion may be fed back into the following iteration.  For this purpose we need to
bring in another rule.
One basic example for this kind of rule is suggested:
(1)After each iteration the best treated participant is identified by some criterion
set a priori. A candidate criterion may be the attainment ratio as defilled for partic―
ipantゲby: | 』ヶ―
"ど
1/えF・
(2)The particlpant, say,  who has been identified as the best treated one 、v ll be
asked by tte ttst of the participants to lower his satisfactory level for his own,ど
:
tO g手
′wheЮ g,<g:′.It may also be the case that sonme or all of the other members
excluding the one best treated may enter into negotiation with the others to form a
coutettcoalition against the one best treated ; thus indirectly pressing this partici―
pant into giving up part of the achievement he has enioyed in the current cost allo―
cation patterno We will leave this mechanism open to the participants.
(3)For generahty let us distinguish between two kinds of attainment ratio definable
for participant,at iteration stage力,i.e.,the absolute attainment ratio(AAR)and
the relative attainment ratio (RAR). They are defined as i
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44R,=|ど;1)一χ;め1/が1)..…………………………………………。(1・■)
R4R,=|ど
;々
)―″
;´
)tハ(め。…………………………………Ⅲ……。(1・12)
A set of scenarios presupposed is listed in Table V.
Table V Operation strategy for the game
IA I H K   I M
17.36
21,95
4.59
none
9.85
17.08
7.23
none
g
g
λ
additional
condition
13.89
8.06
10.31
g
g
光
additional
condition
5.12
10,76
g
g
ト
additional
condition
eliminated
eliminated
eliminated
'汀
=10'0
g
g
え
additional
condition ″打 +″κ +″L=25,0
eliminated
eliminated
eliminated
″L = 10・0
4.4 Dem。■stratiom
To put the discussin on the context of the Swedish case study, let us basc our
galne on the same data as shown in Table lII. It is lloted that the implication and
role of this type of game should be empirically demonstrated by applying the tech―
g
g
λ
additionaI
condition
0.82
10。91
10.09
none
6.4
15.88
9.48
none
12.89
20.81
7.92
nOne
14.06
21.98
7.92
none
??
?
?
?
一 : No change to the preceding Problem
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nique to a forum where those people who really represent the interests of six
municipalities, A,Iに,K, M and T will be asked to play the game.  Practically,
however,the typical patterns lnay not be so inany.  Some of them rnay even be predict―
able at the risk of oversimplifying what other、vise 、vould occur in a1locating the
costS, It iS hoped that to pick up one plausible example may help expose the impli―
cation and role of the game. In light of this collSideration a demoIIStration will be
made on the basis of a preassumed set of senarios(see Tab]e vI。)
Table VI Results of the game
I  P12yer
ξ
η
RAR
AAR
″
ζ
η
RAR
AAR
20.112
2.752
0,0
0.40
19.699↓
5.809
0.0
0,28
0.49
9.850
5.211
5,211
1.0
9,850->
5.211
5.211
1,0
1.0
5.320
6.050
1.544
0.57
4.188↓
7.272
0,0
0.67
0.67
12.084
5.684
0.0
0.40
13.222↑
6.333
0.0
0。28
0.28
17.639
4.749
0.0
0.40
17.878↑
7.568
0.0
0.28
0,37
18.809
4.749
0.0
0.40
18.983↑
7,733
0,0
0.28
0.39
″
ξ
η
RAR
AAR
″
ζ
η
RAR
AAR
″
ξ
η
RAR
AAR
ξ
η
RAR
AAR
19.699-Ⅲ
5.809
0,0
0.28
0.49
19.699-ぅ
5.809
0.0
0.28
0.49
20.321↑
6.431
0,0
0.20
0.35
20.321-
6.431
0.0
0.20
0,35
9,850→
5,211
5,211
1,0
1,0
10,000↑
0.98
10,000‐
0.98
4.535↑
7.272
3.557
0,63
0.63
4.385↓
7.272
3.707
0,61
0,61
2.588↓
8.056
6.283
0.82
0,32
12.875↓
7,755
0.0
0,28
0.32
12.875-)
7,755
0.0
0.28
0,32
12.412↓
8.585
1.293
0.32
0.37
18,688↑
8.378
0.0
0.20
0.27
18.983-)
7.733
0,0
0。28
0.38
19.811↑
8.561
0.0
0.20
0.27
11:解
lη;::→
捻1脆
17.878-)
7.568
0.0
0.28
0.39
10,000-
0,98
4.000↑
7.051
3.871
0.68
0.68
11,000↓
0.51
18.688-テ
8.378
0.0
0,20
0。27
19.811…Ⅲ
8.561
0.0
0.20
0.27
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(1)The game is initiated by the specification of both satisfactory and p6r■lissible
level for the individual participant's goal. The results of the computations by use
of our model are listed in Table V.
(2)Stage l i We get the following cost allocation.
"4= 20.ヱ=2,メπ= 9.850,πrf = σ.926,ガL= =2.0∂を,
こM= =7.δ99,″T= ヱ3.899.
Vヽe note that:
FFr tt πκ十″と= 27.2δ = σ g路塩 L),
πИ+T″十 "T =σσoσδ =θ(■,二Xと,7T)一ι gtt L L).
This implies that A, M and T have allied to keep their total share to the ■linimum
by dettanding H, K and L to share s total cost of 27.26 which is the maximum II,
K and L could share, It should be noted, however, that the grand coalition has not
yet been totally broken dowa but it is still maintained in the sellse that L functions
as an interface between(H,K)and(A,M,T). That is,L enioyS the benefit Of
the property imbedded in the model that the attainment of L's gOal should be bal―
anced agaillst the attainment of the others'. So do the group (A, M, T),  It iS
observed that the attainment ratio for L equates those for A, 勲I and T (th  ratio
being O。40),whettas those for H and K are l.O and O.57, respectively.
Given this result, a natural reaction by the group (A,M,T) ■light be such that
they argue that H should share more than it currently does.  Vヽithout directly
forcing H to increase its share A, M and T may attempt to pressure H indirectly by
demanding higher satisfactory levels for themselves, We assume that the satisfactory
levels for A, M and T have been raised while leaving the rest of conditions un―
changed as shown in Table IV.
(3)Stage 2:The result is that A enioyS a higher attainment in goal, whereas M,T
and L get lo、ver attainments. (Note that this is the case if measured in terms of
44P, If 14eaSured with R4β,the attainment ratio for A equates those for M, T
and L).
Notably K turn out to share a less cost than it did in the previous stage, although
K did not raise its satisfactory level, This has been causcd by the fact that L has
still kept in tOuch with the group (A, II,T),thereby implcitly agreeing on the
mechanism of balancing the attainment of his goal against those of A, M and T. It
should be observed also thatコI sh res as he did before.
Lct us assume that L still sticks tO maintaining its contact with (A, M, T) but
wants to do so only by bargaining with (4, M, T)tO increasc his satisfactory level.
(4)Stage 3 :rrhis results in an increased attainment fOr L and a decreased attainment
for K(K being cottpellsating as much as L gives up to share),while no change
whatsoever in the attainments for A, M and T.  Note also that there is still no
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change in the share of H.
It、vユll not be later than in this stage that K and L will have become aware of the
fact that a higher attainment will be achieved only through bargaining iointly with
H in order to press H to share rnore,  It is assumed that K and L have succeeded in
persuadingコ[to share as much as 10.0 (not mOre than that;nor less than that).
(5)Stage 4 : This leads the participants to the situation in which only K enioyS the
benefit of decrease in share, whereas A, M, T and even L have to share as much as
they had to in the previous Stage. A natural reaction fron■K Elight be that L wants
to force K to share more. K may,however, argue that since he has known that K
could share less(if the rest of participants except L accepted the cost a110cation Of
stage 2),L would have to share more.
L now knows that L should get H as well as K on his side in order to bargain with
the group (A, II,T),arguing that the group (H, K, L)are llegitiinately unfavored
by the enforced total share of 27.26.  Suppose his bangaining turns Out to be
successful. Then,(II, K, L,)are al10Cated as much as 25,00 in total.
(6)Stage 5, The result is thak K and L enioy a benefit of decrease in share, while
A,II and T have to share more.  After this L may start bargaining again with K
by saying that L should share as much as 4.000 、Thich is still less than he would
have to share at best(by referring to the result of stage 2)。
(7)Stage 6,If K yields to L to accept this argument, L would lo、ver itS burden by
2,while K would have to increase its burden by the the same amount,
(8)「rhe prOcess further goes on until the participants corne to agree on a unique
solution.  In due course of time, however, it may be likely that the scope of cost
allocation is narrowed and screened so the process may not be repeated endiessly.
As has been demonstrated in the preceding discussion the pa珀,icipaats have been
learning the implications of what they a priori structured in their cOSt allocation
procedure. They have also learned about the resultant outputs(cOSt allocation pat―
terns)to be derived from feeding the input conditions prescribed by thenl into the
core‐based lnodel. In this cOntext it may also help the participants become aware of
the characteristics of the notion of core in a clearly specified scope。 lrhey may even
learn that to break the endless process they will need to add some norlns or princi―
ples to the notion of core, as has been suggested by Young, Okada and Hashimoto.1)
5, Conclusio■
With the case study of S、veden as a basis,some extended approach has been sug■
gested to the inclusion of dynanlic performances into the process of cost allocation.
A multi‐obieCtiVe programming model has been developed based on the notion of core.
Some demonstration has beerl made to suggest the needed further attempt to develop
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this type of model. There will be natural situations which demand of the proposed
model. The Swedish case which motivated this study has proved to be an excellent
example. More gellerally the model of this kind may find wide application in diverse
situations、7here participants desire to obtain a deeper understanding of the implications
of、vhat they have tentatively agreed to be the basis of cost allocation. In this sense
the model,、vith further development and experiment, will provide the parしic pants
in a joint enterprise with a potent tool to learn the mechanism of cost allocationo  lt
is also hoped that it mav help them becolne aware of the need for the incorporation
of some other norms or principles , thus developing an excellent inteFfaCe With the
work done by Young, Okada and Hashimoto.
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